30-day evidence series

JAL 1975: meals held outside temperature control for 28 hours before service

196 of 344 passengers fell ill after meals were held outside temperature control for roughly 28 hours. The failure occurred entirely after preparation.

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Incident evidence note

What this public record shows

GCCAP Ground Cold-Chain Assurance Platform Incident Database
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Record GL-04

JAL 1975: meals held outside temperature control for 28 hours before service

Date of record3 February 1975
LocationAnchorage, Alaska to Copenhagen, Denmark
TypeFoodborne illness outbreak — aircraft
Source tierTier 1 — peer-reviewed medical literature (The Lancet) and contemporaneous investigation

What the record shows

On 3 February 1975, 196 of 344 passengers and one cabin crew member aboard a Boeing 747 developed gastrointestinal illness after a ham omelette breakfast loaded at Anchorage. 142 passengers and the crew member were hospitalised on arrival in Copenhagen. It remains the largest documented foodborne illness event in aviation history.

Investigators traced contamination to staphylococcal lesions on a cook's hand. But contamination alone did not cause the outbreak. Published analysis records the food was held at room temperature for approximately 14 hours, then at 10°C for a further 14 and a half hours — roughly 28 hours outside proper temperature control. The meals sat in the kitchen around six hours before refrigeration, and were later placed in aircraft ovens rather than a chilled module for a further eight hours.

Contemporary analysis concluded that had the food been held correctly throughout, the outbreak would not have occurred. The flight crew were unaffected only because they had chosen steak rather than the breakfast service.

Evidence gap

The contamination event was identified. The temperature history that turned it into a mass casualty event was reconstructed retrospectively, by investigators, after 196 people were already ill. No contemporaneous record existed showing where the food was, at what temperature, and for how long.

This incident is the origin of the industry practice requiring cockpit crew to eat separately prepared meals. It also resulted in one death by suicide, of an executive at the catering subsidiary.

GCCAP boundary

Evidence support only

GCCAP uses public records to identify evidence gaps in temperature-sensitive food movement. It does not certify food safety, declare legal compliance, assign liability or allege fault.